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ARTICLE 
WHAT HAPPENS ON MYSPACE STAYS ON MYSPACE: 
AUTHENTICATION AND GRIFFIN V. STATE 
By: Mark C. Kopec 
This Article discusses authentication of social media evidence and 
focuses on the recent Court of Appeals of Maryland decision in Griffin v. 
State. l Griffin was a split-decision in a case of first impression in 
Maryland.2 The majority held that certain social media requires a greater 
degree of authentication than non-electronic evidence because of "the 
potential for abuse and manipulation of a social networking site by 
someone other than its purported creator and/or user.,,3 The court 
described three "authentication opportunities" and stated that possible 
avenues "will, in all probability, continue to develop as the efforts to 
evidentially utilize information from the [social media] sites increases.,,4 
These authentication opportunities are explored below, and Griffin's 
application to other factual scenarios is discussed. 
1. MYSPACE 
Griffin involved an account on Myspace, a social networking website.5 
In order to create a free account on myspace.com,6 a user must fill in 
information for first and last name, provide an email address, choose a 
password, enter a birth date, and indicate gender. 7 The user is then given 
an opportunity to upload a photo.8 The site automatically sets your 
location based on the location of the computer used to create the account, 
but the information can be changed.9 Additionally, a country and state 
I Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343,19 A.3d 415 (2011). 
See id. at 351, 19 A.3d at 420. 
Id. at 357, 19 A.3d at 424. 
4 Id. at 363, 19 A.3d at 427 (citing Katherine Minotti, Comment, The Advent of Digital 
Diaries: Implications of Social Networking Web Sites for the Legal Profession, 60 S.c. L. 
REv. 1057 (2009». 
5 MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.comlHelp/AboutUs?pm_cmp=edJooter (last visited 
Feb. 19,2012); see also United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 453 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing 
testimony of a Myspace executive describing Myspace as "a social networking" website). 
6 See MYSPACE, https:llwww.myspace.comlsignup (last visited Feb. 19,2012) (click on 
the "Sign up free" hyperlink located on the right side of the webpage). 
7 Id. 
8 See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 453-55 (detailing procedures to become a member through 
testimony of a Myspace executive). 
9 See MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.comlmy/settings/profilelbasicinfo (last visited 
Mar. 2,2012). 
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must be selected from drop down menus, but anything can be listed as the 
town, real or fictional. 10 
In fact, all of a user's identifying information can be fictional. The 
fields for first and last name must be filled in, but the information entered 
does not have to be accurate. Nicknames can be used. The fields will 
accept anything, including gibberish. Anyone who possesses the 
requested information about another person can create an account 
purporting to be that person. II 
Once an account is created, the user gets a page on the website. 12 The 
user can then post different types of content on the page, including 
statements, photos, and links to other websites. 13 A user can become 
"friends" with other users.14 Those "friends" also can post items on the 
user's page. IS Myspace has privacy settings that allow users to limit 
access to their personal pages only to their "friends," while excluding the 
general pUblic. 16 Users who are "friends" with one another can also send 
private messages between themselves, which works just like email. 17 
Myspace was founded in 2003. 18 Prior to the advent of social media, 
the court in St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc. provided an 
often-cited early commentary on the "inherently untrustworthy" nature of 
information on the Internet in the context of electronic evidence. 19 In St. 
Clair, the plaintiff attempted to introduce a printout from the United 
States Coast Guard online vessel database to prove the defendant's 
ownership ofa boat.20 The court rejected that evidence, stating: 
Plaintiffs electronic "evidence" is totally insufficient to 
withstand Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. While some look to 
the Internet as an innovative vehicle for communication, the 
Court continues to warily and wearily view it largely as one large 
iO See id. 
II Griffin, 419 Md. at 352-53, 19 A.3d at 421 (citing Nathan Petrashek, Comment, The 
Fourth Amendment and the Brave New World of Online Social Networking, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 
1495, 1499-\500 (2009-2010) (evaluating whether social networking users maintain a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their online activity such that the police would require a 
warrant to search that activity». 
12 See MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.comJpages/privacysettings?pm_cmp=edJooter 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
13 ld. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. 
16 ld. 
17 MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/guide/im (last visited Mar. 2,2012). 
18 John S. Wilson, Comment, Myspace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers in 
Electronic Evidence, 86 OR. L. REV. 1201, 1222 (2007) (citing MYSPACE - WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilMySpace(lastvisitedApr.l1, 2008». 
19 St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 
20 !d. 
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catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and misinformation. So as to not 
mince words, the Court reiterates that this so-called Web provides 
no way of verifying the authenticity of the alleged contentions 
that Plaintiff wishes to rely upon in his Response to Defendant's 
Motion. There is no way Plaintiff can overcome the presumption 
that the information he discovered on the Internet is inherently 
untrustworthy. Anyone can put anything on the Internet. No 
web-site is monitored for accuracy and nothing contained therein 
is under oath or even subject to independent verification absent 
underlying documentation. Moreover, the Court holds no 
illusions that hackers can adulterate the content on any web-site 
from any location at any time. For these reasons, any evidence 
procured off the Internet is adequate for almost nothing, even 
under the most liberal interpretation of the hearsay exception 
rules found in FED.R.CIY.P. 807.21 
While our society's acceptance of, and reliance on, the Internet has 
increased greatly since the 1999 St. Clair decision, similar concerns 
continue with social media. One tragic example involving creation of a 
fictional profile on MySpace occurred in Us. v. Drew.22 There, the 
defendant was the mother ofa 13-year-old gir1.23 The defendant created a 
page on MySpace for a fictional 16-year-old boy, named him "Josh 
Evans," and a posted a photograph of a boy without that boy's 
knowledge.24 The defendant used the fictional profile to contact one of 
her daughter's female classmates and flirted with her over a number of 
days.25 Then, the defendant had "Josh" inform the classmate that he was 
moving away, and told the classmate that "the world would be a better 
place without her in it."26 That same day, the classmate killed herself. 27 
An anonymous identity can also conceal financial interests that are 
behind information placed on the Internet. For example, the Chief 
Executive Officer of Whole Foods Market created an identity called 
"Rahodeb" and posted over 1,100 times to an online financial bulletin 
board over a 7-year period, often championing his company's stock and 
occasionally blasting his company's rival, Wild Oats Market.28 
21 ld. at 774-75 (emphasis in original). 
22 Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452. 
23 ld. at 452. 
24 ld. 
25 Jd. 
26 ld. 
27 ld. The defendant's conviction under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.c. § 
1030, was overturned based on a violation of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.ld. at 463-64. 
28 Andrew Martin, Whole Foods Executive Used Alias, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 12, 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.coml2007 107 I 12/businesS/12foods.html?scp= 1 &sq=whole% 
20foods%20executive%20used%20alias&st=cse. 
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As the use of email expanded, it became increasingly sought by parties 
in litigation, in part because of the casual and candid manner in which 
people use email. The same thing is happening with social media. Social 
media sites like Myspace and Facebook have hundreds of millions of 
users.29 A party's page may contain a statement or picture that is 
inconsistent with a position taken by the party in litigation, or consistent 
with an opponent's position. It can happen in every type of civil or 
criminal case. The issues discussed in this article are arising in litigation 
with ever-increasing frequency. 
II. GRIFFIN V. STATE 
In April 2011, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Griffin v. 
State,30 in which the defendant, Griffin, was on trial for a shooting 
death.31 During the trial, the prosecution sought to introduce pages 
printed from what it contended was Griffin's girlfriend's Myspace page. 32 
The purpose was to provide corroboration of the testimony of a 
prosecution witness that, prior to trial, the witness was threatened by the 
defendant's girlfriend, Jessica Barber.33 
Barber's Myspace profile was under the name "Sistasouljah.,,34 The 
printed pages from the profile described her as a 23-year-old female from 
Port Deposit with a birthday of 10/2/1983, and contained a photograph of 
a male and female. 35 The printed pages also contained the following 
statement: "FREE BOOZY!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET 
STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO YOU ARE! !,,36 
Ms. Barber was called as a witness at trial by the prosecution, but was 
not questioned about the Myspace printed pages.37 Instead, the 
prosecution attempted to authenticate the printed pages through the 
testimony of an investigating police officer. 38 After the defense objected, 
29 See FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.tb.comlcontentldefault.aspx?NewsAreald=22 (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2012) (noting that, on average, at the end of December 2011, Facebook had 
845 million monthly active users and 483 million daily active users); see also Melissa Bell, 
Facebook and MySpace jOint announcement: MySpace welcomes Facebook users, WASH. 
POST BLOG (Nov. 18, 2010, 12:18 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.comlblog-
postl2010/1Ilfacebook_and_myspacejoint_ann.html (explaining that in 2007, MySpace was 
the reigning social network startup with 180 million registered users, but that number shrunk 
to 100 million in February 2010). 
30 Griffin, 419 Md. at 343,19 A.3d at 415. 
31 ld. at 348, 19 A.3d at 418. 
32 ld. 
33 ld. at 348-49,19 A.3d at 418-19. 
34 ld. at 348,19 A.3dat418. 
35 ld. 
36 Griffin, 419 Md. at 348,19 A.3d at 418. 
37 ld. 
38 ld. 
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the officer testified outside the presence of the jury that he believed the 
Myspace page belonged to Ms. Barber because of the photograph of her 
and the defendant on the front, the reference to the defendant, and her 
birth date on the page.39 
The following exchange took place between the trial judge and the 
prosecutor: 
Court: On its face, there is no way that you can conclude 
that on its face this establishes anything in regard 
to [the witness]. What it's being offered for, as I 
understand it, is corroboration, consistency that 
she's making a statement in a public forum, 
"snitches get stitches." And I guess the argument 
is going to be made that that's consistent with 
what [the witness] said, that she threatened him. 
[Prosecutor]: That's correct. 
Court: It's weak. I mean, there's no question it's weak, 
but that's what it is offered for. 4o 
The trial judge permitted the testimony and the defense entered into a 
stipulation, in lieu of the testimony, while maintaining an objection.41 A 
jury ultimately convicted Griffin of second-degree murder and other 
related charges.42 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that 
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the Myspace 
pages into evidence.43 
The Court of Appeals discussed what is required to create a Myspace 
page, and generally how the site works. The court noted concerns that 
someone can create a fictitious account under someone else's name, or 
can gain access to another's account by obtaining the user's login 
information.44 The court also discussed the Drew decision and observed, 
"[t]hus, the relative ease in which anyone can create fictional personas or 
gain unauthorized access to another user's profile, with deleterious 
consequences, is the Drew lesson.'>45 The court stated, "[t]he potential for 
fabricating or tampering with electronically stored information on a social 
39 Jd. at 349,19 A.3d at 418-19. 
40 Jd. at 349-50, 19 A.3d at 419. 
41 Jd. at 350, 19 A.3d at 419. 
42 Grif.fin, 419 Md. at 343, 19 A.3d at 415. 
43 Jd. at 346, 19 A.3d at 417; Griffin v. State, 192 Md. App. 518, 546, 995 A.2d 791, 808 
(2010) rev'd, 419 Md. 343,19 A.3d 415 (2011). 
44 Grif.fin, 419 Md. at 351-54, 19 A.3d at 420-22. 
45 Jd. at 354, 19 A.3d at 421-22. 
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networking site, thus poses significant challenges from the standpoint of 
authentication of printouts of the site, as in the present case.,,46 
Authentication is governed by Maryland Rule 5_901.47 Subsection (a) 
provides: 
General provision. The requirement of authentication or 
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied 
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims.48 
Methods of authentication are illustrated in Rule 5-901(b).49 The Griffin 
court stated that the applicable subsections were (b)(l) and (b)(4), which 
provide: 
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of 
limitation, the following are examples of authentication or 
identification conforming with the requirements of this Rule: 
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony of a 
witness with knowledge that the offered evidence is what it is 
claimed to be. 
(4) Circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence, such as 
appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, location, or 
other distinctive characteristics, that the offered evidence is what 
it is claimed to be. 50 
The Court of Appeals looked to the widely cited discussion of 
authentication of electronically stored evidence by Magistrate Judge Paul 
W. Grimm in Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. CO.,51 in which he noted that 
authenticating electronically stored information presents a myriad of 
concerns because "technology changes so rapidly.,,52 Judge Grimm also 
noted that the "complexity" or "novelty" of electronically stored 
information, with its potential for manipulation, requires greater scrutiny 
of the "foundational requirements" than paper records to bolster 
reliability. 53 
46 Id. 
47 MD. R. 5-90 I. The federal counterpart is FED. R. EVID. 90 I. 
48 Griffin, 419 Md. at 354, 19 A.3d at 422. 
49 MD. R. 5-901(b). 
50 Griffin, 419 Md. at 355, 19 A.3d at 422. 
51 Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007). 
52 Id. at 544. 
53 Id. at 543-44 (quoting WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
900.06[3] (2d. ed. 1997)). 
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In its reversal, the Court of Appeals held that the Court of Special 
Appeals had "failed to acknowledge the possibility or likelihood that 
another user could have created the profile in issue or authored the 
'snitches get stitches' posting.,,54 The Court of Appeals explained its 
ruling: 
We agree with Griffin that the trial judge abused his discretion in 
admitting the MySpace evidence pursuant to Rule 5-90 1 (b)(4), 
because the picture of Ms. Barber, coupled with her birthdate and 
location, were not sufficient "distinctive characteristics" on a 
MySpace profile to authenticate its printout, given the prospect 
that someone other than Ms. Barber could have not only created 
the site, but also posted the "snitches get stitches" comment. The 
potential for abuse and manipulation of a social networking site 
by someone other than its purported creator and/or user leads to 
our conclusion that a printout of an image from such a site 
requires a greater degree of authentication than merely identifying 
the date of birth of the creator and her visage in a photograph on 
the site in order to reflect that Ms. Barber was its creator and the 
author of the "snitches get stitches" language. 55 
A. Rule 5-104(b) 
The court declined to address authentication under Maryland Rule 5-
1 04(b), stating: 
Federally, some of the uncertainty involving evidence printed 
from social networking sites has been addressed by embracing the 
notion of "conditional relevancy," pursuant to Federal Rule 
1 04(b), which provides "[ w ]hen the relevancy of evidence 
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall 
admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence 
sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition." 
In this way, the trier of fact could weigh the reliability of the 
MySpace evidence against the possibility that an imposter 
generated the material in question. See Lorraine v. Markel 
American Insurance, 241 F.R.D. 534, 539-40 (2007). Maryland 
Rule 5-1 04(b) establishes a nearly identical protocol; we, 
54 Griffin, 419 Md. at 357, 19 A.3d at 423 (quoting Griffin, 192 Md. App. At 543, 995 
A.2d at 806). 
55 Id. at 357-58, 19 A.3d at 423-24. The court recognized that other courts have 
suggested that greater scrutiny is appropriate for authentication of electronically stored 
information on social networking sites because of the heightened possibility for manipulation 
by other than the true user or poster. Id. at 358, 19 A.3d at 424 (discussing Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 926 N.E. 2d 1162 (Mass. 2010); People v. Lenihan, 911 N.Y.S.2d 588 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2010); United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
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however, have not been asked been asked in this case to address 
the efficacy of the Rule 5-l04(b) protoco1.56 
171 
Professor McLain wrote in her treatise on Maryland Evidence that 
"Md. Rule 5-90l(a), consistent with prior Maryland case law, establishes 
that the standard of proof is the same as is found in Md. Rule 5-1 04(b) for 
facts on which the relevance of an item is conditioned.,,57 It therefore 
appears that the Griffin analysis under Rule 5-90l(a) may also apply 
under .5-104(b ). 
III. GRIFFIN DISSENT 
Judge Harrell wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Judge Murphy, 
who is the author of another Maryland evidence treatise, Maryland 
Evidence Handbook. 58 The dissent noted that Maryland Rule 5-901 
derives from Federal Rule of Evidence 901, and that federal cases 
construing the federal rule are "almost direct authority impacting 
construction ... of an [analogous Maryland Rule]. ,,59 The dissent relied 
on federal cases in which courts held that "a document is properly 
authenticated if a reasonable juror could find in favor of its 
authenticity.,,6o The dissent noted that, although the Court of Appeals had 
not previously enunciated such a standard, it is consistent with Maryland 
Rule 5-901 's requirement of "evidence sufficient to support a finding that 
the matter in question is what its proponent claims.,,61 The dissent stated: 
Applying that standard to the present case, a reasonable juror 
could conclude, based on the presence of the MySpace profile of 
(1) a person appearing to [the investigating officer] to be Ms. 
Barber posing with the defendant, her boyfriend; (2) a birthdate 
matching Ms. Barber's; (3) a description of the purported creator 
of the MySpace profile as being a twenty-three year old from Port 
Deposit; and (4) references to freeing "Boozy" (a nickname for 
the defendant), that the redacted printed pages of the MySpace 
profile contained information posted by Ms. Barber. 62 
The dissent acknowledged the concern that someone other than Ms. 
Barber could have accessed or created the account, and have posted the 
56 Griffin, 419 Md. at 365 n.15, 19 A.3d at 428 n.15. 
57 ld. at 367 n.2, 19 A.3d at 429 n.2 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (quoting LYNN McLAIN, 
MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 901: 1 (2001)). 
58 JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK (4th ed. 1999). 
59 Griffin, 419 Md. at 365-66, 19 A.3d at 428-29 (Harrell, J., dissenting). 
60 ld. at 366, 19 A.3d at 429 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (internal 
citations omitted). 
61 ld. (emphasis in original). 
62 ld. at 367, 19 A.3d at 429 (Harrell, J., dissenting). 
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threatening message, but stated that the record suggested no motive to do 
SO.63 The dissent felt that such concerns went not to the admissibility of 
the Myspace page printouts under Rule 5-901, but rather to the weight to 
be given by the trier of fact. 64 The dissent added: 
It has been said that the "purpose of authentication is to ... filter 
untrustworthy evidence." Like many filters that are unable to 
remove completely all impurities, Rule 5-901 does not act to 
disallow any and all evidence that may have impurities (i.e., in 
this case evidence that could have come, conceivably, from a 
source other than the purported source). As long as a reasonable 
juror could conclude that the proffered evidence is what its 
proponent purports it to be, the evidence should be admitted. The 
potentialities that are of concern to the Majority Opinion are fit 
subjects for cross-examination or rebuttal testimony and go 
properly to the weight the fact-finder may give the print-outs.65 
IV. MAJORITY V. DISSENT 
One court has suggested that electronic evidence has the "same 
uncertainties" concerning authenticity as traditional documents, which 
can have forged signatures or be on a stolen letterhead, but it declined to 
create unique rules for electronic evidence.66 There is a strong argument, 
however, that the opportunity and ease with which electronic evidence 
can be fabricated has led to substantially more widespread abuse in 
electronic media than with traditional documents. This includes digital 
photographs, which can be altered much more easily than traditional 
photographs developed from film. 
These differing views are what divided the majority and dissent in 
Griffin. The majority has placed a greater burden on the authentication of 
printouts from social media sites than on traditional documents. In doing 
so, the court ensures that juries will not receive unreliable evidence that 
fails to meet this heightened standard. 
Under the dissent's approach, the jury would receive the evidence 
upon a minimal showing from which it could be concluded that the 
evidence is authentic. An opponent of fabricated evidence would 
essentially have the burden shifted to him to prove the fabrication. 
Depending on the facts of an individual case, the opponent of the 
63 Id. at 367, 19 A.3d at 429-30 (Harrell, J. dissenting). 
64 Id. at 367, 19 A.3d at 430 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (citing Hays v. State, 40 Md. 633, 
648 (1874)). 
65 Griffin, 419 Md. at 368, 19 A.3d at 430 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (internal citations 
omitted). 
66 See In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91,95-96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). 
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evidence may not have access to the same sources and evidence as the 
proponent in order to make such a showing. Meanwhile, all of this plays 
out in front of the jury in a potentially distracting sideshow. While this 
may be the usual process under Rule 5-1 04(b) when the jury has to decide 
admissibility, the area of social media evidence is likely to involve more 
instances of fabricated evidence. The majority's requirement of a greater 
degree of authentication for this type of evidence should reduce the 
number of such sideshows. 
The tradeoff is that, under the majority's analysis, otherwise relevant 
and admissible social media evidence will be excluded if the heightened 
burden of authentication is not met. The methods of authentication 
discussed by the Griffin majority are discussed below. Some of the 
methods can be costly and time consuming, and there will be situations 
where parties do not have the resources to pursue them. 
v. GRIFFIN METHODS OF AUTHENTICATION 
The Griffin court stated that: 
[W]e should not be heard to suggest that printouts from social 
networking sites should never be admitted. Possible avenues to 
explore to properly authenticate a profile or posting printed from 
a social networking site, will, in all probability, continue to 
develop as the efforts to evidentially utilize information from the 
sites increases.67 
The court added that a number of opportunities come to mind. 68 These 
are discussed below in reverse order as they appear in the majority's 
analysis. 
A. Informationfrom Social Networking Site 
The Griffin court stated that one method "may be to obtain 
information directly from the social networking site that links the 
establishment of the profile to the person who allegedly created it and 
also links the posting sought to be introduced to the person who initiated 
it.,,69 The court stated, "[t]his method was apparently successfully 
employed to authenticate a Myspace site in People v. Clevenstine.,,7o In 
Clevenstine, the court described the testimony from Myspace: "[A] legal 
compliance officer for MySpace explained that the messages on the 
computer disk had been exchanged by users of accounts created by 
67 Griffin, 419 Md. at 363, 19A.3dat427. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 364, 19 A.3d at 428. 
70 Id. (citing People Y. CleYenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. App. Diy. 2009)). 
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defendant and the victims ... ,.?l The basis for this statement is not 
provided in the Clevenstine opinion. It is possible that Myspace was able 
to demonstrate that the defendant's account was accessed by a computer 
using the Internet with the Internet Protocol ("IP") address that was 
assigned to the defendant, but that is not known. The Clevenstine court 
also relied on other evidence, as further discussed below. 
There are hurdles, however, in obtaining information directly from the 
social networking site. Myspace and Facebook are the largest sites, and 
they are both located in California. Both sites can decline to voluntarily 
provide information, and have done so. Without voluntary cooperation, 
an out of state litigant must arrange for a California subpoena to be issued 
and properly served. In addition, any attempt to quash the subpoena may 
be heard by the California court that issued the subpoena. 
Moreover, there may be a motion to quash the subpoena under the 
Stored Communications Act ("SCA,,).72 In 2010, the U.S. District Court 
for the Central District of California held in a case of first impression that 
the SCA applies to social networking sites. 73 "The SCA prevents 
'providers' of communication services from divulging private 
communications.,,74 The court noted that the SCA was passed in 1986, 
before the advent of the World Wide Web. 75 The court observed that the 
"[SCA] is not built around clear principles that are intended to easily 
accommodate future changes in technology.,,76 The court went through a 
lengthy analysis before quashing the subpoenas, finding that private 
messages and page postings that could only be viewed by "friends" were 
protected from discovery under the SCA.77 
The SCA also contains a complex scheme allowing for disclosure of 
certain information in response to a subpoena issued by a governmental 
entity in connection with a criminal investigation or case. 78 The SCA's 
scheme does not apply in civil cases, and was not at issue in Crispin. It is 
not clear whether the scheme was invoked to obtain the Myspace 
representative's testimony in Clevenstine. 
The Crispin decision will be an important precedent for issues 
involving application of the SCA to social networking sites, particularly 
when the dispute is heard in a California court that has jurisdiction over 
Myspace and Facebook. Presently, this method of pursuing 
71 Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 514. 
72 Stored Communications Act (SCA),18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2008). 
73 Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965,971-72 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
74 ld. 
75 ld. at 971 n.15. 
76 Jd. 
77 ld. at 991. 
78 !d. at 974-75 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2009». 
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authentication is likely to be the least attractive one, especially in civil 
litigation. 
B. Computer Search 
The second method "may be to search the computer of the person who 
allegedly created the profile and posting and examine the computer's 
internet history and hard drive to determine whether that computer was 
used to originate the social networking profile and posting in question.,,79 
The Griffin court noted that computer forensic firms could conduct such a 
search.8o One complicating factor for this option is the variety of ways in 
which someone can create and use a social networking profile, like 
Myspace. It can be created or used on a computer or a smart phone. In 
addition, it can be created or used on devices owned by someone else, 
including a computer at the public library. Moreover, the creation of the 
profile might be done on one device, while the use occurs on another. 
The Griffin court specified that the search would be to determine if the 
person's computer was used to create the profile and posting. In a case 
decided after Griffin, one court noted that someone other than the creator 
could use the profile because people "frequently remain logged in to their 
accounts while leaving their computers and cell phones unattended.,,81 
Given the emphasis by the Griffin court on the computer, and not the 
user, it appears that such an argument against authentication would fail in 
Maryland. 
The Griffin court discussed the Clevenstine case in connection with 
the method of obtaining information directly from the social networking 
site. Clevenstine is discussed in this section of this Article because one of 
the facts not discussed in Griffin is that the defendant's wife in 
Clevenstine testified that she saw the Myspace instant messages at issue 
in the defendant's Myspace account while logged on to the computer they 
shared.82 
In Clevenstine, the defendant was convicted of rape and other sexual 
crimes involving two teenage girls.83 The defendant's wife found the 
saved instant message communications between the defendant and the 
younger victim, revealing sexually explicit discussions and indicating that 
the two had engaged in sexual intercourse.84 The defendant contended 
79 Griffin, 419 Md. at 363,19 A.3d at 427. 
80 Id. at 363-64, 19 A.3d at 427-28. 
81 State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). 
82 Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 513. 
83 Id. at 511. 
84 Id. at 513. 
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that the instant messages were improperly admitted into evidence because 
they had not been properly authenticated.85 The court held: 
Here, both victims testified that they had engaged in instant 
messaging about sexual activities with defendant through the 
social networking site MySpace, an investigator from the 
computer crime unit of the State Police related that he had 
retrieved such conversations from the hard drive of the computer 
used by the victims, a legal compliance officer for MySpace 
explained that the messages on the computer disk had been 
exchanged by users of accounts created by defendant and the 
victims, and defendant's wife recalled the sexually explicit 
conversations she viewed in defendant's MySpace account while 
on their computer. Such testimony provided ample authentication 
for admission of this evidence. Although, as defendant suggested 
at trial, it was possible that someone else accessed his MySpace 
account and sent messages under his usemame, County Court 
properly concluded that, under the facts of this case, the 
likelihood of such a scenario presented a factual issue for the 
jury. 86 
The wife's discovery of the messages on the computer she shared with 
the defendant is what one court called a "confirming circumstance.,,87 
That term is further explored below. 
Once it appears that social media evidence is relevant to a case, 
practitioners will want to evaluate the option of searching the computer 
and smart phone devices that belong to the purported creator of the social 
media evidence at issue. In addition to the issues discussed above, it 
must be kept in mind that people can replace these devices on a frequent 
basis, whether it is due to wear and tear, to upgrade, to get the newest 
technology, or otherwise. Practitioners should keep in mind replacement 
issues when deciding when to conduct such a search, as the delay could 
be very costly. 
C. Testimony by Creator 
The Griffin court stated that the "first, and perhaps most obvious 
method would be to ask the purported creator if she indeed created the 
profile and also if she added the posting in question ... ,,88 This 
corresponds under Rule 5-901(b)(1) to testimony of a witness with 
85 Id.at5l4. 
86 !d. (internal citations omitted). 
87 Commonwealth v. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d 372, 380 (Mass. 2011). 
88 Griffin, 419 Md. at 363, 19 A.3d at 427. 
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knowledge that offered evidence is what it is claimed to be.89 The court 
stated that "a witness with knowledge. such as Ms. Barber, could be 
asked whether the MySpace profile was hers and whether its contents 
were authored by her; she, however, was not subject to such inquiry when 
she was called by the State. ,,90 
In addition to being the most obvious method, asking the purported 
creator also is the method that can provide the most reliable evidence of 
authentication. The question is whether the purported creator created the 
evidence at issue. The best evidence is an admission by the creator under 
subsection (b)( 1). By contrast, evaluation of circumstantial evidence 
under subsection (b)( 4) can merely provide a picture from which it is 
hoped that authentication can be determined. While each case of 
circumstantial evidence will have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, 
cases involving an admission by the creator should result in easy 
authentication. Practitioners will therefore want to consider all of the 
discovery tools available in pursuing an admission by the creator of social 
media evidence. Methods will differ based on whether the purported 
creator is a party or non-party, and whether the proceeding is a civil or 
criminal one. Careful planning may be required to match available 
discovery tools with each of the steps in the process: discovering the 
existence of social media evidence; determining whether it is relevant; 
obtaining the actual social media evidence; and developing the evidence 
of authentication. 
VI. APPLICATION OF GRIFFIN To OTHER SOCIAL MEDIA SCENARIOS 
The Griffin case involved a posting on a Myspace profile. However, 
the decision will be looked to for guidance in cases involving other social 
media scenarios under the Rule 5-901 (b)( 4) circumstantial evidence 
standard, such as private messages between two users. The Griffin 
court's discussion of two particular cases may be useful: One involved 
private Myspace messages that work like email; the other involved instant 
messages on an unspecified system. 
The Griffin court discussed Commonwealth v. Williams91 as an 
instance in which a court "suggested greater scrutiny [of social media] 
because of the heightened possibility for manipulation by other than the 
true user or poster.,,92 In Williams, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts held that Myspace computer messages were not properly 
authenticated.93 A prosecution witness testified that she was with the 
89 Id. 
90 ld. at 355 n.ll, 19 A.3dat422 n.ll. 
91 Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162 (Mass. 2010). 
92 Griffin, 419 Md. at 358,19 A.3d at 424. 
93 Williams, 926 N.E.2d at 1172. 
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defendant on the night of the murder, heard him speak on the phone with 
the victim, saw him display a gun before leaving, and then saw him return 
with a lot of money. 94 At trial, the witness testified that she received 
messages on MySpace from the defendant's brother urging her not to 
testify against the defendant, or to claim a lack of memory about the 
events.95 The witness printed out the messages.96 The printout showed a 
picture of the defendant's brother on the MySpace page, and that the 
username was "Doit4it," but the messages did not identify the sender by 
his or her given name.97 
The witness responded to three of the messages received from the 
defendant's brother, and said that the defendant's brother sent messages 
back to her.98 She did not respond to a fourth message.99 The Griffin 
court did not discuss these facts, and the Williams opinion did not provide 
the details of the messages or responses. 100 The Williams court held that 
there was insufficient evidence to authenticate the Myspace messages: 
The contents of the messages demonstrate that the sender was 
familiar with [the witness] and the pending criminal cases against 
the defendant and desired to keep her from testifying. 
There was insufficient evidence to authenticate the messages and 
they should not have been admitted. Although it appears that the 
sender of the messages was using [defendant's brother's] 
MySpace Web "page," there is no testimony (from [the witness] 
or another) regarding how secure such a Web page is, who can 
access a MySpace Web page, whether codes are needed for such 
access, etc .... Here, while the foundational testimony established 
that the messages were sent by someone with access to 
[defendant's brother's] MySpace Web page, it did not identify the 
person who actually sent the communication. Nor was there 
expert testimony that no one other than Williams could 
communicate from that Web page. Testimony regarding the 
contents of the messages should not have been admitted. 101 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Jd. 
98 Id. 
99 Williams, 926 N.E.2d at 1172. 
100 See Griffin, 419 Md. at 358-60, 19 A.3d at 424-25; see also Williams, 926 N.E.2d at 
1171-73 (discussing the authentication of the Myspace messages, but not the details of the 
messages). .... 
101 Williams, 926 N.E.2d at 1172-73. 
, 
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The other notable case is In re F.p.102 The Griffin court distinguished 
the case because it involved instant messages between two persons, rather 
than po stings on social media that could be viewed by anyone. 103 In re 
F.P. analyzed instant messages sent using an unidentified system. 104 The 
proceeding was an appeal from adjudication on aggravated assault by a 
delinquent. 105 The defendant argued that the trial court inappropriately 
admitted transcripts of instant messages between him and the victim, 
which occurred prior to the assault, and that the instant messages were 
not properly authenticated. 106 
The instant messages were between a user with the screen name 
"Icp4Life30" and "WHITEBOY Z 404.,,107 The victim testified that his 
screen name was "WHITE BOY Z," that he printed the instant messages 
off of his computer, and that he believed that the other participant in the 
conversation was the defendant. los Defendant believed that the victim had 
stolen a DVD from him, and allegedly sent the victim messages saying he 
wanted to fight. 109 The court described the instant messages as follows: 
It appears that there are transcripts of several instant message 
"conversations" between [victim] and [defendant] on at least two 
different dates. In the first conversation, apparently taking place 
July 30, 2003 and initiated by [defendant], [victim] asks "who is 
this," and [defendant] replies, using his first name as it appears in 
the record. Throughout the transcripts, [defendant] threatens 
[victim] with physical violence and accuses [victim] of stealing 
from him. [Victim] states, "i got no reason to fight u and u got no 
reason to fight me[";] [defendant] answers, "ya i do. u stole off 
me." Later, [defendant] taunts [victim] and tells him to come 
over to his house; when [victim] states, "well i won't [sic] be there 
cuz [sic] i not fightin u[";] [defendant] replies, ''well i am fightin 
u so when i see u ur [sic] dead.,,11O 
After receiving these instant messages, the victim notified his school 
counselor and social worker. III Defendant and the victim met with the 
school officials separately regarding the messages and the alleged theft.112 
\02 In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91 (pa. Super. Ct. 2005). 
\03 Griffin, 419 Md. at 361,19 A.3d at 426. 
104 Id. 
\05 In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 92. 
\06 Id. 
\07 Id. at 94. 
\08 Id. 
\09 Id. 
110 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
111 In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 94. 
112 Id. 
180 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 42.2 
One fact not discussed in Griffin is that the defendant did not deny 
sending the instant messages. 113 Subsequent to the school meeting, and 
just before the assault, another instant message conversation occurred. I 14 
Defendant allegedly stated "u gotta tell tha [sic] school shit n stuff like a 
IiI [sic] bitch.,,115 He also threatened, "want my brother to beat ur ass on 
tha [sic] steel center bus" and "want [sic] till i see u outta school ima [sic] 
beat ur aSS [sic ].,,116 
The court found that there existed sufficient evidence that the 
defendant sent the instant messages. 117 The defendant referred to himself 
by his first name, and he repeatedly accused the victim of stealing from 
him, which mirrored testimony that the defendant was angry about a 
stolen DVD. The defendant also referenced the fact that the victim had 
approached school authorities about the instant messages, and repeatedly 
threatened the victim. The court stated, "[a]ll of this evidence, taken 
together, was clearly sufficient to authenticate the instant message 
transcripts as having originated from [defendant].,,1l8 The court also 
stated: 
Essentially, [defendant] would have us create a whole new body 
of law just to deal with e-mails or instant messages. The 
argument is that e-mails or text messages are inherently unreliable 
because of their relative anonymity and the fact that while an 
electronic message can be traced to a particular computer, it can 
rarely be connected to a specific author with any certainty. 
Unless the purported author is actually witnessed sending the e-
mail, there is always the possibility it is not from whom it claims. 
As [defendant] correctly points out, anybody with the right 
password can gain access to another's e-mail account and send a 
message ostensibly from that person. However, the same 
uncertainties exist with traditional written documents. A 
signature can be forged; a letter can be typed on another's 
typewriter; distinct letterhead stationary can be copied or stolen. 
We believe that e-mail messages and similar forms of electronic 
communication can be properly authenticated within the existing 
framework ofPa.R.E. 901 and Pennsylvania case law .... We see 
no justification for construing unique rules for admissibility of 
113 See generally Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343 (2011). The In re F.P. court discussed the 
fact that the defendant did not deny sending the instant messages, but the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland did not discuss this fact in its analysis. In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 94. 
114 In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 94-95. 
115 ld. at 95. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
lIS Id. 
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electronic communications such as instant messages; they are to 
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis as any other document to 
determine whether or not there has been an adequate foundational 
showing of their relevance and authenticity. I 19 
The Griffin court distinguished the case, stating: 
In the Interest of F.P. is unpersuasive in the context of a social 
networking site, because the authentication of instant messages by 
the recipient who identifies his own "distinctive characteristics" 
and his having received the messages, is distinguishable from the 
authentication of a profile and posting printed from MySpace, by 
one who is neither a creator nor user of the specific profile ... 120 
We further note that authentication concerns attendant to e-mails, 
instant messaging correspondence, and text messages differ 
significantly from those involving a MySpace profile and posting 
printout, because such correspondences is sent directly from one 
party to an intended recipient or recipients, rather than published 
for all to see. 121 
181 
It is not clear how the Griffin court would have addressed the 
authentication of messages sent by social media. There are similarities 
between In re F.P. and Williams, yet the Griffin court discussed them 
differently. Both cases involved messages that were sent from one user 
to another that appeared to be private, although In re F.P. did not specify 
the system used for the instant messages. The content of the messages in 
Williams is unknown. In In re F.P., the court provided significant details 
that persuaded it to find sufficient evidence of authentication, including 
defendant's failure to deny sending the instant messages during 
communications with school officials. 122 
Authentication of privates messages sent with social media under Rule 
5-901(b)(4)'s circumstantial evidence standard will focus on the overall 
picture to determine whether there exists sufficient evidence to conclude 
that the messages are authentic. In addition to testimony of the recipient 
of the messages, the content of the messages will be important to the 
extent that they contain information and details likely only known by the 
alleged sender. The overall picture will vary from case to case, and 
courts will likely have to grapple with this issue on a case-by-case basis. 
Also likely to be important are "confirming circumstances," which are 
further discussed below. 
119 Id. at 95-96. 
120 Griffin, 419 Md. at 361, 19 A.3d at 426. 
121 Griffin,419Md.at361 n.13, 19A.3dat426n.13. 
122 In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 94. 
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VII. CONFIRMING CIRCUMSTANCES 
When the Griffin court discussed testimony of a witness with 
knowledge under Rule 5-901(b)(1), it noted that, in the case at hand, Ms. 
Barber could have been asked whether the MySpace profile was hers, and 
whether its contents were authored by her, but she was not asked those 
questions. 123 The Griffin court then cited Us. v. BarlowJ24 and Us. v. 
Gagliardi. 125 Both cases, however, did not involve a profile post; they 
involved private messages. 126 In both cases, adult defendants were 
convicted of crimes relating to attempts to have sex with minors. 127 Both 
involved authentication of messages sent between the defendants and 
infonnants working for law enforcement posing as minors. 128 
In Barlow, the messages were exchanged on the Yahoo! Messenger 
instant messaging service, and by email. 129 At the defendant's 
instigation, the conversations were explicit, and the defendant emailed 
multiple pornographic pictures of himself. 130 
The court noted that the defendant did not contend that the message 
log was altered. l3l The court then stated: 
At trial, [infonnant] testified that the transcripts fairly and fully 
reproduced the chats between her (posing as [ a minor]) and 
[defendant]. [Infonnant], as the other participant in the year-long 
"relationship," had direct knowledge of the chats. Her testimony 
could sufficiently authenticate the chat log presented at trial, and 
it was not plainly erroneous to admit the transcript on this 
basis.132 
In Gagliardi, the instant messages were sent through an Internet chat 
room called "I Love Older Men.,,133 The defendant expressed his desire 
to have sex, and emailed a picture of himself to the purported underage 
girl. 134 He also sent similar messages to an FBI agent who was posing as 
another minor. 135 The court held that authentication was proper because 
the informant and FBI agents both testified that "the exhibits were in fact 
123 Griffin, 419 Md. at 355-56, 19 AJd at 422-23. 
124 United States v. Barlow, 568 FJd 215 (5th Cir. 2009). 
125 United States v. Gagliardi, 506 FJd 140 (2d Cir. 2007). 
126 Barlow, 568 F.3d at 217-18; Gagliardi, 506 F.3d at 143-44. 
127 Barlow, 568 F.3d at 218; Gagliardi, 506 FJd at 143-44. 
128 Barlow, 568 F.3d at 217; Gagliardi, 506 FJd at 143. 
129 Barlow, 568 F.3d at 218. 
130 ld.at218. 
131 ld. at 220. 
l32 ld. 
133 Gagliardi, 506 F.3d at 143. 
134 ld. 
135 ld. 
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accurate records" of the conversations with defendant. 136 The court found 
that the informant and FBI agents were witnesses with knowledge under 
Rule 5-901(b)(1).137 
There is a good argument that the analysis in Barlow and Gagliardi 
would not be appropriate under Griffin. There were no details in the 
opinions about any distinctive characteristics in the messages. It can be 
argued under the Williams decision, also cited in Griffin, that testimony 
by the recipient of the messages alone in these cases is insufficient to 
establish the identity of the actual sender of the messages. There were 
other important facts, however, that the Barlow and Gagliardi courts did 
not make part of their authentication analysis. They are what the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has called "confirming 
circumstances.,,138 When these confirming circumstances are added into 
the analysis, it appears that even a heightened degree of authentication 
required by Griffin would be met. 
In Barlow, the instant message communications at issue scheduled a 
meeting for a particular time and place, and the defendant showed up as 
planned.139 That is certainly strong corroborative evidence that the 
defendant was the one participating in the communications. Moreover, 
when the defendant was arrested at the meeting place, his laptop was in 
his car, and it had "remnants of the chats" with the informant. 140 It is 
these two facts, or "confirming circumstances," that provide the strongest 
evidence of authentication, yet they were not part ofthe court's analysis. 
Similarly, in Gagliardi, the defendant was arrested at a meeting time 
and place that had been arranged in the messages at issue. 141 The 
defendant also admitted to police that "he was at the location to meet two 
thirteen-year-old girls with whom he had previously had sexually explicit 
online conversations.,,142 Those "confirming circumstances" were not 
part of the court's authentication analysis. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts discussed "confirming 
circumstances" in Commonwealth v. Purdy,143 which was decided 13 
days before Griffin. In Purdy, the defendant was convicted of crimes 
relating to running a house of prostitution. 144 On appeal, he claimed that 
136 ld. at 15l. 
137 ld. 
138 See Purdy, 945 N.E.2d at 380 (Mass. 2011) (explaining that "confinning 
circumstances" are those "that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that [the] evidence 
is what its proponent claims it to be."). 
139 Barlow, 568 F .3d at 218. 
140 ld. 
141 Gagliardi, 506 F.3d at 143. 
142 ld. at 143-44. 
143 Purdy, 945 N.E.2d 372. 
144 ld. at 376. 
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ten email exchanges admitted into evidence had not been properly 
authenticated. 145 The emails were taken from a computer located on the 
premises at issue. 146 The defendant admitted that the computer was his 
and that he used it. 147 He also provided from memory the passwords 
necessary to access the computer. 148 The emails were sent from an email 
address that had defendant's first and last names in it, and defendant 
admitted he used the account. 149 The court described some of the emails 
as follows: 
Among the e-mail exchanges admitted in evidence was one that 
was initiated from the defendant's e-mail address and signed with 
the defendant's name and the address of the salon, and had the 
"header," "personal assistant with benefits?" The author wrote 
that he was "seeking a personal secretary with an open mind, who 
... knows where to keep her nose and where not." In response to 
a reply from a recipient, the author described himself as a 
"working artist, as well [as an] entrepreneur, small business guy, 
hairstylist, art and antiques dealer, [and] massage therapist," and 
added "and I operate a service." In a later e-mail in this 
exchange, also from the defendant's e-mail address, the author 
asserted that potential earnings could range from $200 to $2,000 
per week. 
A separate e-mail was entitled "massage" and was sent from the 
defendant's e-mail address and signed with the defendant's first 
name. The author describes a "blond girl" who is "fairly new 
and so a little nervous," and states: "If you are gentle and kind to 
her I'm sure you're going to have a very good time." He adds, 
"She has beautiful breasts and she will allow light touching. It is 
ok, but no other touching." The recipient of the e-mail responded 
that he wanted an "unhurried session" with a "gal who will treat 
me right[,] be slow [,] gentle and very friendly within her limits." 
An e-mail from the defendant's e-mail address and signed with 
defendant's first initial replied, "I will make sure you are treated 
well.,,150 
The defendant denied authoring the emails, and moved in limine to 
preclude their admission into evidence. 151 He stated that the computer 
145 /d. 
146 ld. at 377-78. 
147 Jd. at 377. 
148 ld. 
149 Purdy, 945 N.E.2d at 378. 
150 ld. 
151 ld. at 379. 
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was always on, and that the masseuses knew his passwords and used the 
computer frequently. 152 He testified that they used his email account to 
play pranks on him and to answer emails in his name. 153 The court 
observed that the prosecution "did not furnish direct evidence that the 
defendant had authored any of the ten e-mails admitted in evidence; there 
was no testimony that anyone observed him typing any of the e-mails or 
that anyone had discussed any of the e-mails with him.,,154 
The court stated, "[w]hile e-mails and other forms of electronic 
communication present their own opportunities for false claims of 
authorship, the basic principles of authentication are the same.,,155 The 
court added that a "judge making a detennination concerning the 
authenticity of a communication sought to be introduced in evidence may 
look to 'confirming circumstances' that would allow a reasonable jury to 
conclude that this evidence is what its proponent claims it to be.,,156 The 
court concluded: 
Here there were adequate "confirming circumstances" to meet 
this threshold: in addition to the e-mails having originated from 
an account bearing the defendant's name and acknowledged to be 
used by the defendant, the e-mails were found on the hard drive 
of the computer that the defendant acknowledged he owned, and 
to which he supplied all necessary passwords. While this was 
sufficient to authenticate the e-mails in the absence of persuasive 
evidence of fraud, tampering, or "hacking," there was additional 
evidence of the defendant's authorship of most of the emails.At 
least one e-mail contained an attached photograph of the 
defendant, and in another, the author described the unusual set of 
services provided by the salon when he characterized himself, 
among other things, as a "hairstylist, art and antiques dealer, [and] 
massage therapist." The defendant's uncorroborated testimony 
that others used his computer regularly and that he did not author 
the e-mails was relevant to the weight, not the admissibility, of 
these messages. 157 
The court distinguished its opinion in Williams, noting that the sender 
of the messages in that case did not identify himself with the name of the 
defendant's brother, or any other name. 158 The messages in Williams 
152 Id. at 378. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 379-80. 
155 Purdy, 945 N.E.2d at 381. 
156 Id. at 380. 
157 Id. at 381-82. 
158 Id. at 382 n. 7. 
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could have been sent from any computer, while the messages in Purdy 
were sent from the defendant's password protected computer. 159 
Although the Purdy court did not apply a heightened degree of 
authentication for the emails, its use of "confirming circumstances" 
should be applicable in Maryland cases. The Griffin court did not use 
that term, but did discuss searching a computer as a method of 
authentication, which could yield evidence that constitutes "confirming 
circumstances.,,160 Moreover, there will be other evidence that will be 
significant "confirming circumstances," even if it is not part of the 
"distinctive characteristics" of the social media evidence itself under 5-
901(b) (4). Good examples are the defendants in Barlow and Gagliardi 
showing up at meetings that were planned in the messages they allegedly 
sent. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Under Griffin, a greater degree of authentication is required of certain 
social media evidence. Practitioners will find that the best evidence of 
authentication of social media evidence is an admission by the creator. 
Cases without such an admission will have to be analyzed on a case-by-
case basis, particularly the cases in which the proponent relies on 
circumstantial evidence under Rule 5-90 1 (b)(4). Confirming 
circumstances will be important in cases where the evidence itself does 
not contain sufficient "distinctive characteristics" under 5-901 (b)( 4) to 
establish authentication. 
The Griffin court noted that methods to authenticate social media 
evidence might continue to develop. Developments could include 
changes in technology or laws, such as revision to the SCA to bring it in 
accord with updated technology. Advances in technology, however, have 
at times raised more questions than they have answered. Such is the 
current state of affairs with authentication of social media. Open 
questions remain as the courts implement Griffin's guidance to other 
factual scenarios. 
159 Id. 
160 See Griffin, 419 Md. at 363-64, 19 A.3d at 427-28 (discussing possible avenues 
available to properly authenticate printouts from social networking websites). 
